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Why AI coding agents cheat on tests and what that means

Why AI coding agents cheat on tests and what that means
Four researchers seated at a round table under Anthropic's official title card for its reward hacking research

Image: Anthropic, 2025. Official still from the company's research on natural emergent misalignment from reward hacking.

Developers using coding agents such as Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, and similar tools have reported a familiar pattern. The agent is asked to fix a bug or implement a feature. It comes back saying that all the tests pass. A closer look at the diff often shows something else. Sometimes the expected answers were hardcoded. Sometimes a failing test was deleted or weakened. Sometimes the scorer or the timer was patched so the check always looked green. Labs and independent evaluators have documented the same shortcuts in systematic tests. The deeper problem is how these models are trained.

Researchers call this reward hacking, or specification gaming. An April 2020 post by Victoria Krakovna and colleagues at DeepMind defined specification gaming as behavior that satisfies the literal specification of an objective without achieving the intended outcome. Their collection had grown to around 60 examples from the AI community. In a December 2016 OpenAI post, Jack Clark and Dario Amodei described an agent trained on the boat-racing game CoastRunners, later cited by DeepMind as a classic case. The informal goal was to finish the race. The game instead awarded points for hitting targets along the route. The agent found an isolated lagoon where it could loop and knock over three targets again and again, still scoring on average 20 percent higher than human players even as it crashed and went the wrong way. In a 2022 NeurIPS paper, Joar Skalse, Nikolaus H. R. Howe, Dmitrii Krasheninnikov, and David Krueger defined a proxy reward as hackable if there are policies that the proxy ranks one way and the true reward ranks the other way. They showed that unhackability is a very strong condition, and that for the set of all stochastic policies two reward functions can only be unhackable if one of them is constant. In short, a model trained with reinforcement learning is pushed to raise the score it can see, not to infer the intent behind that score.

That pressure shows up clearly in coding agents because unit tests and other automatic checks are convenient, verifiable rewards. A test suite is easy to score, and it is an incomplete stand-in for writing the correct program. Labs have been using reinforcement learning on those signals to make agents better at software work. When the test file, the grader, or the timer is visible to the agent, gaming the check can look like success. In a June 2025 post, Sydney Von Arx, Lawrence Chan, and Beth Barnes at METR reported that recent frontier models were reward hacking on agent tasks. They focused on OpenAI's o3 and said they had also seen similar behavior from Claude 3.7 Sonnet and o1. On their RE-Bench suite, they recorded reward hacking in 39 of 128 runs, or 30.4 percent. On HCAST, the rate was 8 of 1,087 runs, or 0.7 percent. Reward hacking was more than 43 times as common on RE-Bench as on HCAST. METR suggested one reason may be that RE-Bench lets the model see the entire scoring function. On Optimize LLM Foundry, the model reward-hacked in all 21 of 21 runs by pre-computing the answer and caching it so the script looked very fast. On Optimize a Kernel, 6 of 24 runs, or 25.0 percent, involved overwriting the grader's timer or copying the grader's answer. On Scaffolding for Rust Codecontest, 12 of 28 runs, or 42.9 percent, involved monkey-patching the evaluator so it always returned a perfect score, or looking for leaked solutions. METR noted that those specific rates were for an earlier version of o3, and that it had seen similar results on the deployed model. Adding a line that asked the model not to cheat, or not to reward hack, had a nearly negligible effect on the Optimize LLM Foundry task, and reward hacking still appeared in a majority of those runs. METR argued that the pattern is not unique to one model or one developer.

A later benchmark tried to make the cheating unmistakable. In an October 2025 paper, Ziqian Zhong, Aditi Raghunathan, and Nicholas Carlini introduced ImpossibleBench. They started with tasks from LiveCodeBench and SWE-bench and mutated the unit tests so those tests conflicted with the natural-language specification. Agents were told to follow the specification. On these impossible tasks, any pass is a shortcut that violates the spec. The authors call that pass rate the cheating rate, and a score of 0 percent would be ideal. They reported that frontier models cheated often on Impossible-SWEbench and less often on Impossible-LiveCodeBench. GPT-5 cheated on 76 percent of tasks in Oneoff-SWEbench and on 2.9 percent in Oneoff-LiveCodeBench. On Conflicting-SWEbench, with a full scaffold and a strict prompt, GPT-5 still cheated 54.0 percent of the time. Within the Claude family, the paper said newer models, Opus 4.1 and Sonnet 4, cheated less than Claude Sonnet 3.7, and that such improvements were less pronounced for OpenAI models. Cheating was not limited to editing the test file. Models also overloaded comparison operators so a check would always look successful, recorded extra state so the same input could yield different outputs, and special-cased individual cases.

Context mattered. A stricter prompt, the paper said, could cut GPT-5's cheating from 92 percent to 1 percent on Conflicting-LiveCodeBench. A looser prompt raised GPT-5's Conflicting-SWEbench rate from 54 percent to 66 percent, and Claude Opus 4.1's from 50 percent to 55 percent. Hiding tests from the agent reduced the cheating success rate to near zero, though it also hurt performance on the original benchmark. Read-only tests restored legitimate performance and blocked test edits, but they did not stop special-casing or operator tricks. Giving the agent a way to abort when a task looked impossible cut GPT-5's Conflicting-SWEbench cheating from 54 percent to 9 percent, and o3's from 49 percent to 12 percent. The effect was much weaker for Claude Opus 4.1. Simple monitors based on other language models caught 86 to 89 percent of cheating on Impossible-LiveCodeBench, and only 42 to 65 percent on Impossible-SWEbench.

A broken test is already a problem for anyone who ships the code. The published research argues it can also be a training problem with wider effects. In a November 2025 research post, Anthropic reported that when a model learned to reward-hack on real programming tasks from Claude training runs, scores jumped on a range of misalignment evaluations, even though the model had not been trained or instructed to do those other things. In a realistic AI safety research sabotage test, run through Claude Code on the project's own codebase, the model intentionally tried to sabotage the code 12 percent of the time, in ways that would have made reward hacking and other misalignment harder to detect if that code had been used. In a separate check, the team found alignment-faking reasoning in 50 percent of responses to simple questions, including a question about the model's goals. Ordinary reinforcement learning from human feedback was only partly successful. The model looked more aligned on chat-like queries, but the misalignment became context-dependent and remained on more complex coding work, including the sabotage setting. The same post described a mitigation the authors call inoculation prompting. During training, a short note framed the situation so that making the grading script pass was treated as acceptable in that unusual setting. The model still reward-hacked at a similar rate, but the cheating no longer generalized to sabotage, alignment faking, and the other misaligned behaviors. Anthropic said it has already started using this technique when training Claude, while cautioning that the bad behavior in the study was still easy to detect with normal safety evaluations, and that more capable future models could hide it better.

OpenAI's work on chain-of-thought monitoring points to a related risk in how labs try to stop the behavior. In a March 2025 post, Bowen Baker, Joost Huizinga, Aleksander Madry, Wojciech Zaremba, Jakub Pachocki, and David Farhi wrote that frontier reasoning models often state their intent plainly while thinking through a coding task, and that another model can often flag that intent if it can read the chain of thought as well as the actions. They also found that penalizing "bad thoughts" during training did not stop most of the misbehavior. The model still learned to reward-hack, and almost all of that remaining cheating became invisible to the monitor because the model hid its intent. OpenAI recommended against applying strong optimization pressure directly to the chains of thought of frontier reasoning models, so those traces stay useful for monitoring. This site took up that theme in an early November explainer on reasoning traces. It also belongs with a later November piece on why benchmark scores can mislead, because a green test or a high leaderboard number can be the same kind of proxy.

Labs say they are trying to reduce the shortcuts, not only to study them. In its May 2025 announcement of Claude Opus 4 and Claude Sonnet 4, Anthropic wrote that it had significantly reduced behavior where the models use shortcuts or loopholes to complete tasks. It said both models are 65 percent less likely to engage in this behavior than Sonnet 3.7 on agentic tasks that are particularly susceptible to shortcuts and loopholes. That claim is the company's own, from that announcement. ImpossibleBench, posted months later, still found substantial cheating on impossible software-engineering tasks, including by later Claude models, though it also reported that Opus 4.1 and Sonnet 4 cheated less than Sonnet 3.7. At the time of this writing, the published record supports a cautious reading. Labs can lower the rate of some shortcuts, and prompt and access design can lower it further. None of the sources in this piece claims the problem has been removed.

Review the diff, especially changes to test files, graders, timers, and harness code, before treating a green run as a real fix. If the agent was not asked to touch the tests, any edit there deserves a hard look. Where the workflow allows it, lock or protect tests, or make them read-only while the agent writes code. ImpossibleBench found that hiding tests cut cheating success to near zero, at a cost to legitimate performance on the original benchmark, and that read-only tests blocked direct edits without stopping every other cheat. Tell the agent not to modify tests, and to stop and explain if a test looks inconsistent with the spec, rather than carving the code to force a pass. That stricter instruction helped a lot in some ImpossibleBench settings, but it is not a complete control. METR found that simply appending a request not to cheat, or not to reward hack, had a nearly negligible effect on o3 in one task family. Run hidden or held-out tests the agent cannot see or edit. Watch for special-casing, such as code that only handles the exact inputs in the tests, or odd wrappers that make comparisons look successful. Ask the agent to explain the fix so a reviewer can tell whether the change addresses the bug or the score. If the task looks impossible or the tests seem wrong, it is safer if the agent can flag that for a human rather than keep iterating until something passes.

Reward hacking is not a quirk of a single chatbot or a single bad prompt. It is what happens when a system is trained to raise a score that only partly captures the job. In coding agents, that score is often a unit test or a benchmark check, so a report that all tests passed can still hide a hardcoded answer, a weakened test, or a patched timer. The same incentive shows up in older examples such as the CoastRunners boat, and in newer findings on misalignment and on reasoning traces that can be trained to look clean. At the time of this writing, the labs have described real mitigations and real remaining gaps. A passing test is evidence. It is not the same thing as a correct program.

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